How the skilled migration program has been corrupted
* Eleven failures of policy and governance *
Overview
The Federal Government has been able to deliberately oversupply the engineering labour market since 2012-13 because the skilled migration program is heavily biased against the interests of Australian citizens and existing permanent residents, particularly those who are unemployed, underemployed or displaced from their occupations. As part of a long-term agenda, the skilled migration program has become a key device in allowing successive Federal Governments to impose their enormous annual migration intakes on the country, and in satisfying the self-interested demands of the business, migration and university sectors (see Section 15 of the report).
The Federal Government has been able to deliberately oversupply the engineering labour market since 2012-13 because the skilled migration program is heavily biased against the interests of Australian citizens and existing permanent residents, particularly those who are unemployed, underemployed or displaced from their occupations. As part of a long-term agenda, the skilled migration program has become a key device in allowing successive Federal Governments to impose their enormous annual migration intakes on the country, and in satisfying the self-interested demands of the business, migration and university sectors (see Section 15 of the report).
One major consequence of this agenda is that Australian citizens and existing permanent residents who are looking for work in professional occupations have become increasingly disadvantaged because these labour markets are continually oversupplied by the influx of new migrants. Australian citizenship has become devalued because the Government gives so many foreign nationals equal access to overcrowded Australian professional labour markets. Considering this, it is the view of the author that the skilled migration program has been corrupted to a level which would not be tolerated by Australian voters if they understood in detail how the program operated.
Key aspects of the program that illustrate how it has become corrupted are outlined below, with a focus on the engineering profession (ie. ANZSCO Minor Group '233 Engineering Professionals'). Nearly all of these aspects disadvantage Australian skilled jobseekers.
1. Medium and Long-term Strategic Skills List inclusion requirements are irrational (see pages 30 & 31 of the report)1.
In the 2016 review of the occupations on the Department of Education and Training's Skilled Occupation List (renamed in April 2017 as the Medium and Long-term Strategic Skills List (MLTSSL)), the focus was on which occupations should be available for skilled migration during the next year to address the skills needs of the economy in five-to-ten years’ time. This has now changed to four-to-ten years' time. In practice, there is great difficulty in determining the skills needs for an individual occupation more than two years in advance. The medium to long-term focus makes no sense because it takes the Government on average only two months to process applications for the subclass 482 (Temporary Skills Shortage) visa for skilled migrants. There is no need to attempt to address future skills needs so many years in advance.
When the labour market is substantially oversupplied, as it is with engineering occupations, bringing in more migrants via listing of occupations on the MLTSSL only serves to entrench unemployment and displacement from the profession, for Australian and migrant engineers alike. When engineers cannot find work in their occupation for a couple of years or more, employers are usually ruthless in excluding them from any job opportunities they apply for. It becomes increasingly difficult for these engineers to maintain the required continuing professional development when they are not in the engineering workforce, putting at risk their professional accreditations.
It is therefore nonsensical to bring migrant engineers into a vastly oversupplied labour market in the belief that this will contribute to skills needs in the economy in more than four years’ time. This approach reflects the Department of Education and Training's 'Stockpiling Theory' of the labour market, which bears no resemblance to real-world labour market practices.
In September 2017 it was announced that the Department of Jobs and Small Business would assume responsibility for providing advice to the Government on the composition of the MLTSSL and the Short-term Skilled Occupation List (STSOL). No change to the focus of the MLTSSL was announced.
It is obvious that the MLTSSL is simply a device to bring more migrants into the country, while conveniently by-passing any consideration of current labour market conditions and employment outcomes. Those engineers whose careers are ended because the labour market has been deliberately oversupplied are treated as cannon fodder by the Government.
In the 2016 review of the occupations on the Department of Education and Training's Skilled Occupation List (renamed in April 2017 as the Medium and Long-term Strategic Skills List (MLTSSL)), the focus was on which occupations should be available for skilled migration during the next year to address the skills needs of the economy in five-to-ten years’ time. This has now changed to four-to-ten years' time. In practice, there is great difficulty in determining the skills needs for an individual occupation more than two years in advance. The medium to long-term focus makes no sense because it takes the Government on average only two months to process applications for the subclass 482 (Temporary Skills Shortage) visa for skilled migrants. There is no need to attempt to address future skills needs so many years in advance.
When the labour market is substantially oversupplied, as it is with engineering occupations, bringing in more migrants via listing of occupations on the MLTSSL only serves to entrench unemployment and displacement from the profession, for Australian and migrant engineers alike. When engineers cannot find work in their occupation for a couple of years or more, employers are usually ruthless in excluding them from any job opportunities they apply for. It becomes increasingly difficult for these engineers to maintain the required continuing professional development when they are not in the engineering workforce, putting at risk their professional accreditations.
It is therefore nonsensical to bring migrant engineers into a vastly oversupplied labour market in the belief that this will contribute to skills needs in the economy in more than four years’ time. This approach reflects the Department of Education and Training's 'Stockpiling Theory' of the labour market, which bears no resemblance to real-world labour market practices.
In September 2017 it was announced that the Department of Jobs and Small Business would assume responsibility for providing advice to the Government on the composition of the MLTSSL and the Short-term Skilled Occupation List (STSOL). No change to the focus of the MLTSSL was announced.
It is obvious that the MLTSSL is simply a device to bring more migrants into the country, while conveniently by-passing any consideration of current labour market conditions and employment outcomes. Those engineers whose careers are ended because the labour market has been deliberately oversupplied are treated as cannon fodder by the Government.
2. There is an excessive focus on just three professions (see pages 67 & 68 of the report)
Three groups of professionals are substantially over-represented in the skilled migration program: engineers, ICT professionals, and accountants. In 2015-16, these three professions alone constituted 38% of the permanent skilled migration program and 22% of the notorious subclass 457 Temporary Work (Skilled) visa intake, equating to approximately 31% of the overall skilled migration program.
In contrast, despite one of the largest residential housing booms in Australian history occurring in cities on the east coast, in 2015-16 tradespeople accounted for only 13% of the overall skilled migration program, and construction tradespeople represented only 3% of the overall total.
In order to meet its enormous annual immigration targets, the Federal Government needs to bring in a large migrant labour force into an Australian labour market which is relatively subdued outside the residential construction industry. The reason for the extreme skewing in the spread of occupations of migrants is that the Government is seeking to minimise any political damage to itself that could result from oversupplying a politically-sensitive segment of the labour market. To achieve this, it has allowed the oversupply to be concentrated in occupations which are non-unionised and which are not part of the key constituencies of the major political parties. This has been facilitated by the peak bodies for the three professions. In an oversupplied labour market, these organisations consistently advocate for the lucrative revenue streams they obtain from doing migration skills assessments, at the expense of the employment outcomes of their own constituents.
Australians seeking work in these three professions bear the brunt of competition from the annual skilled migrant influx.
Three groups of professionals are substantially over-represented in the skilled migration program: engineers, ICT professionals, and accountants. In 2015-16, these three professions alone constituted 38% of the permanent skilled migration program and 22% of the notorious subclass 457 Temporary Work (Skilled) visa intake, equating to approximately 31% of the overall skilled migration program.
In contrast, despite one of the largest residential housing booms in Australian history occurring in cities on the east coast, in 2015-16 tradespeople accounted for only 13% of the overall skilled migration program, and construction tradespeople represented only 3% of the overall total.
In order to meet its enormous annual immigration targets, the Federal Government needs to bring in a large migrant labour force into an Australian labour market which is relatively subdued outside the residential construction industry. The reason for the extreme skewing in the spread of occupations of migrants is that the Government is seeking to minimise any political damage to itself that could result from oversupplying a politically-sensitive segment of the labour market. To achieve this, it has allowed the oversupply to be concentrated in occupations which are non-unionised and which are not part of the key constituencies of the major political parties. This has been facilitated by the peak bodies for the three professions. In an oversupplied labour market, these organisations consistently advocate for the lucrative revenue streams they obtain from doing migration skills assessments, at the expense of the employment outcomes of their own constituents.
Australians seeking work in these three professions bear the brunt of competition from the annual skilled migrant influx.
3. Caps for the subclass 189 skilled independent 'population-booster' visa are absurdly high
In 2016-17, grants of the subclass 189 skilled independent visa represented 38% of all visa grants to primary applicants in the permanent skilled migration program. This visa is subject to a cap (or ‘occupational ceiling’) for each ANZSCO Unit Group (which is a Government classification for a group of related occupations). The cap is set at 6% of the workforce size for each Unit Group, which is commonly accepted to be the percentage of the workforce which needs to be replaced each year to maintain the same workforce size. The minimum cap size is set at 1,000 visa grants.
The occupational ceilings also include the family-nominated component of the subclass 489 temporary visa, grants of which are insignificant when compared with those for the subclass 189 visa.
The occupational ceilings are set absurdly high. They are equivalent to the entire annual replacement rate of Unit Groups, when many other types of visas are also granted to migrants in the same occupations.
For engineering occupations the situation is particularly bad, because the Government does not use Census data as the basis for workforce size but instead uses data from the Australian Labour Force Survey (ALFS), which is plagued by sampling errors due to the very small proportion of the workforce which is surveyed. The ALFS consistently estimates the size of the engineering workforce to be much greater than the reliable Census data – about 45% greater in the case of the 2016 Census. This results in the size of the occupational ceilings being much larger than they should be.
On top of this, the requirement for a minimum ceiling of 1,000 visa grants per Unit Group means that the ceilings are huge for Unit Groups with smaller workforce sizes. In engineering, the ceilings are as high as 21.6% of the workforce size for ‘2334 Electronics Engineers’ and 33.9% of the workforce size for ‘2331 Chemical and Materials Engineers’, where the workforce size is based on 2016 Census data. Ceilings are not always reached, but often they are.
In 2016-17, grants of the subclass 189 visa constituted 82% of all permanent visa grants to migrant professional engineers. In recent years it has been this visa which has had the greatest impact on the oversupply of the engineering labour market.
The number of visa grants for the subclass 189 visa depends largely on the demand from potential migrants. Occupational labour market considerations are not taken into account by the Government when grants of this visa are made. The visa is used simply to help the Government reach its annual skilled migration targets. It is a ‘population-booster’ visa.
This was confirmed in 2018 when a Department of Home Affairs (DHA) document titled ‘Policy Intent for the Use of Occupational Ceilings’ was released under the Freedom of Information Act. The document states that “the few occupations that are meeting their ceilings are (generally) Engineers, Accountants and IT Professionals, and by the nature of meeting their ceilings they are dominating the programme”. For the reasons given in Item 2 above, the Government has allowed this to continue.
In 2016-17, grants of the subclass 189 skilled independent visa represented 38% of all visa grants to primary applicants in the permanent skilled migration program. This visa is subject to a cap (or ‘occupational ceiling’) for each ANZSCO Unit Group (which is a Government classification for a group of related occupations). The cap is set at 6% of the workforce size for each Unit Group, which is commonly accepted to be the percentage of the workforce which needs to be replaced each year to maintain the same workforce size. The minimum cap size is set at 1,000 visa grants.
The occupational ceilings also include the family-nominated component of the subclass 489 temporary visa, grants of which are insignificant when compared with those for the subclass 189 visa.
The occupational ceilings are set absurdly high. They are equivalent to the entire annual replacement rate of Unit Groups, when many other types of visas are also granted to migrants in the same occupations.
For engineering occupations the situation is particularly bad, because the Government does not use Census data as the basis for workforce size but instead uses data from the Australian Labour Force Survey (ALFS), which is plagued by sampling errors due to the very small proportion of the workforce which is surveyed. The ALFS consistently estimates the size of the engineering workforce to be much greater than the reliable Census data – about 45% greater in the case of the 2016 Census. This results in the size of the occupational ceilings being much larger than they should be.
On top of this, the requirement for a minimum ceiling of 1,000 visa grants per Unit Group means that the ceilings are huge for Unit Groups with smaller workforce sizes. In engineering, the ceilings are as high as 21.6% of the workforce size for ‘2334 Electronics Engineers’ and 33.9% of the workforce size for ‘2331 Chemical and Materials Engineers’, where the workforce size is based on 2016 Census data. Ceilings are not always reached, but often they are.
In 2016-17, grants of the subclass 189 visa constituted 82% of all permanent visa grants to migrant professional engineers. In recent years it has been this visa which has had the greatest impact on the oversupply of the engineering labour market.
The number of visa grants for the subclass 189 visa depends largely on the demand from potential migrants. Occupational labour market considerations are not taken into account by the Government when grants of this visa are made. The visa is used simply to help the Government reach its annual skilled migration targets. It is a ‘population-booster’ visa.
This was confirmed in 2018 when a Department of Home Affairs (DHA) document titled ‘Policy Intent for the Use of Occupational Ceilings’ was released under the Freedom of Information Act. The document states that “the few occupations that are meeting their ceilings are (generally) Engineers, Accountants and IT Professionals, and by the nature of meeting their ceilings they are dominating the programme”. For the reasons given in Item 2 above, the Government has allowed this to continue.
4. International graduates are given virtually unfettered access to the Australian labour market (see pages 44 & 45 of the report)
Foreign students who graduate from Australian universities are given direct access to the labour market via the subclass 485 temporary visa and the subclass 189 permanent residence visa, among others. In engineering occupations – which are significantly oversupplied – this adds enormously to the competition experienced by domestic (ie. Australian) graduate engineers for the limited number of available entry level positions. The consequence of poor market conditions and deliberate labour market oversupply is that the percentage of domestic graduate engineers who can find work in a role even broadly related to their field of study has fallen considerably since 2012. A significant percentage of Australian engineering graduates will never have the opportunity to practice in the occupation associated with their degree qualifications.
Over time, if an increasing number of Australian high school students make what is for them a rational decision not to study engineering (and this is already happening with mining engineering), the ratio of Australian engineering graduates to international graduates will fall, and an increasing proportion of entry level engineering jobs will be filled by international graduates. This is advantageous for the Government: it can satisfy the demand for graduate engineers with an increasing proportion of international graduates who either pay full fees for their education in Australia, or who have obtained their qualifications overseas. This saves the Government money. It is also advantageous for business, as it is more likely that international graduates will work for lower salaries, particularly if they commence work on a temporary visa in the hope of obtaining a permanent residence visa in future.
Domestic graduates who are unable to find employment in a role even broadly related to their field of study have been treated as cannon fodder by the Federal Government.
Foreign students who graduate from Australian universities are given direct access to the labour market via the subclass 485 temporary visa and the subclass 189 permanent residence visa, among others. In engineering occupations – which are significantly oversupplied – this adds enormously to the competition experienced by domestic (ie. Australian) graduate engineers for the limited number of available entry level positions. The consequence of poor market conditions and deliberate labour market oversupply is that the percentage of domestic graduate engineers who can find work in a role even broadly related to their field of study has fallen considerably since 2012. A significant percentage of Australian engineering graduates will never have the opportunity to practice in the occupation associated with their degree qualifications.
Over time, if an increasing number of Australian high school students make what is for them a rational decision not to study engineering (and this is already happening with mining engineering), the ratio of Australian engineering graduates to international graduates will fall, and an increasing proportion of entry level engineering jobs will be filled by international graduates. This is advantageous for the Government: it can satisfy the demand for graduate engineers with an increasing proportion of international graduates who either pay full fees for their education in Australia, or who have obtained their qualifications overseas. This saves the Government money. It is also advantageous for business, as it is more likely that international graduates will work for lower salaries, particularly if they commence work on a temporary visa in the hope of obtaining a permanent residence visa in future.
Domestic graduates who are unable to find employment in a role even broadly related to their field of study have been treated as cannon fodder by the Federal Government.
5. Government departments ignore labour market evidence
From 2012-13 onwards, the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (now absorbed into the Department of Home affairs (DHA)) ignored advice from a range of sources – including other Government departments – about the oversupply of the engineering and other professional labour markets. This was for politically motivated reasons, as described in the Overview above. This department had, and still has, the ultimate say in which occupations are included on, or excluded from, the skilled migration occupation lists (SMOLs). One of these lists is the MLTSSL, which is the only list on which engineering occupations are included.
In September 2017, the Department of Employment (now the Department of Jobs and Small Business (DJSB)) announced that it had assumed responsibility for reviewing the occupations listed on the skilled migration occupation lists (SMOLs). The DJSB makes recommendations to the DHA about the composition of the SMOLs.
In November 2017, DJSB announced a public consultation process as part of its review of the SMOLs. When it came time to call for submissions from the public, DJSB published a 'traffic light bulletin' documenting its recommendations for the lists. There were no proposed changes for the existing MLTSSL listings of the occupations in the most heavily oversupplied professions, ie. engineering, accounting, and information & communication technology. DJSB advised that:
"There were substantial changes to the skilled migration occupation lists in April and July 2017. Therefore, the Government has prioritised continuity and stability. For this reason, no changes have been proposed for the medium and long-term strategic skills list at this time."
Nearly all engineering occupations have been listed continuously on the MLTSSL and its predecessor, the Skilled Occupation List, for many years. A proper review process had again been avoided by the Government.
In May 2018, DJSB issued another traffic light bulletin as part of its six-monthly consultation process on the composition of the SMOLs. Again the recommendation of the DJSB was to keep all engineering occupations on the MLTSSL. This time the basis of the recommendation was the department’s draft methodology which incorporates a weighted scoring system for a largely unconnected, ad-hoc group of labour market parameters. Among a range of shortcomings, the scoring system does not include two of the most reliable and robust labour market indicators for occupations: the number of permanent visa grants (supply), and the internet vacancy dataset (demand). For engineering, permanent visa grants represent 60% of all visa grants. The internet vacancy dataset accurately reflects the difficult conditions that still exist in many engineering occupations.
The DJSB has manufactured a politically-motivated scoring system designed to maintain the status quo. A proper review process has again been avoided by the Government.
From 2012-13 onwards, the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (now absorbed into the Department of Home affairs (DHA)) ignored advice from a range of sources – including other Government departments – about the oversupply of the engineering and other professional labour markets. This was for politically motivated reasons, as described in the Overview above. This department had, and still has, the ultimate say in which occupations are included on, or excluded from, the skilled migration occupation lists (SMOLs). One of these lists is the MLTSSL, which is the only list on which engineering occupations are included.
In September 2017, the Department of Employment (now the Department of Jobs and Small Business (DJSB)) announced that it had assumed responsibility for reviewing the occupations listed on the skilled migration occupation lists (SMOLs). The DJSB makes recommendations to the DHA about the composition of the SMOLs.
In November 2017, DJSB announced a public consultation process as part of its review of the SMOLs. When it came time to call for submissions from the public, DJSB published a 'traffic light bulletin' documenting its recommendations for the lists. There were no proposed changes for the existing MLTSSL listings of the occupations in the most heavily oversupplied professions, ie. engineering, accounting, and information & communication technology. DJSB advised that:
"There were substantial changes to the skilled migration occupation lists in April and July 2017. Therefore, the Government has prioritised continuity and stability. For this reason, no changes have been proposed for the medium and long-term strategic skills list at this time."
Nearly all engineering occupations have been listed continuously on the MLTSSL and its predecessor, the Skilled Occupation List, for many years. A proper review process had again been avoided by the Government.
In May 2018, DJSB issued another traffic light bulletin as part of its six-monthly consultation process on the composition of the SMOLs. Again the recommendation of the DJSB was to keep all engineering occupations on the MLTSSL. This time the basis of the recommendation was the department’s draft methodology which incorporates a weighted scoring system for a largely unconnected, ad-hoc group of labour market parameters. Among a range of shortcomings, the scoring system does not include two of the most reliable and robust labour market indicators for occupations: the number of permanent visa grants (supply), and the internet vacancy dataset (demand). For engineering, permanent visa grants represent 60% of all visa grants. The internet vacancy dataset accurately reflects the difficult conditions that still exist in many engineering occupations.
The DJSB has manufactured a politically-motivated scoring system designed to maintain the status quo. A proper review process has again been avoided by the Government.
6. The replacement for the notorious 457 visa, the Temporary Skills Shortage (subclass 482) visa, is still riddled with major problems:
- The Temporary Skills Shortage (TSS) (subclass 482) visa can be granted for four years to occupations on the MLTSSL. This is inherently contradictory, because the TSS visa is intended to address current and near-term labour skill shortages being experienced by employers, whereas the MLTSSL is based on fanciful projections of the occupational skills needs of the economy in four-to-ten years’ time. There is no rational basis for the MLTSSL to be used to help satisfy current skill shortages.
- Even in circumstances where the labour market for an occupation is substantially oversupplied, migrants who are working in that occupation in Australia on the TSS visa can transfer to a permanent residence visa while remaining in the same job. No market testing is required; ie. the job never has to be advertised so that citizens and existing permanent residents can have the opportunity to apply. Australian citizens who are seeking work in the same occupation are bypassed in favour of a foreign national on a temporary visa. This is an example of how the skilled migration program diminishes the value of Australian citizenship. The TSS visa explicitly entrenches this approach with its four year Medium-term stream, which is designed and intended to be a pathway to permanent residence.
- Since 2009 employers have been required to pay workers on 457 visas (now TSS visas) the ‘market rate’ for their wages or salary, and there has also been a minimum wage level for this visa known as the Temporary Skilled Migration Income Threshold (TSMIT), which is not supposed to be breached. The value of the TSMIT is $53,900, and has not changed since 2013. Over recent years, the Australian media and a Senate enquiry have exposed how some employers have ruthlessly abused the ‘market rate’ and TSMIT payment provisions to underpay their employees. In professional ranks, similar abuse has been uncovered among some employers of ICT professionals. The changes implemented with the advent of the TSS visa will not address the appalling governance regime which has allowed these abuses to occur.
- Employers accredited by the Department of Home Affairs are permitted to advertise vacancies on their own business websites, while bypassing major online job portals such as SEEK if they so choose. There is no public list of accredited employers, leaving Australian jobseekers at a disadvantage yet again.
- No independent examination of the qualifications or experience of professionals applying for a TSS visa is required.
- The Temporary Skills Shortage (TSS) (subclass 482) visa can be granted for four years to occupations on the MLTSSL. This is inherently contradictory, because the TSS visa is intended to address current and near-term labour skill shortages being experienced by employers, whereas the MLTSSL is based on fanciful projections of the occupational skills needs of the economy in four-to-ten years’ time. There is no rational basis for the MLTSSL to be used to help satisfy current skill shortages.
- Even in circumstances where the labour market for an occupation is substantially oversupplied, migrants who are working in that occupation in Australia on the TSS visa can transfer to a permanent residence visa while remaining in the same job. No market testing is required; ie. the job never has to be advertised so that citizens and existing permanent residents can have the opportunity to apply. Australian citizens who are seeking work in the same occupation are bypassed in favour of a foreign national on a temporary visa. This is an example of how the skilled migration program diminishes the value of Australian citizenship. The TSS visa explicitly entrenches this approach with its four year Medium-term stream, which is designed and intended to be a pathway to permanent residence.
- Since 2009 employers have been required to pay workers on 457 visas (now TSS visas) the ‘market rate’ for their wages or salary, and there has also been a minimum wage level for this visa known as the Temporary Skilled Migration Income Threshold (TSMIT), which is not supposed to be breached. The value of the TSMIT is $53,900, and has not changed since 2013. Over recent years, the Australian media and a Senate enquiry have exposed how some employers have ruthlessly abused the ‘market rate’ and TSMIT payment provisions to underpay their employees. In professional ranks, similar abuse has been uncovered among some employers of ICT professionals. The changes implemented with the advent of the TSS visa will not address the appalling governance regime which has allowed these abuses to occur.
- Employers accredited by the Department of Home Affairs are permitted to advertise vacancies on their own business websites, while bypassing major online job portals such as SEEK if they so choose. There is no public list of accredited employers, leaving Australian jobseekers at a disadvantage yet again.
- No independent examination of the qualifications or experience of professionals applying for a TSS visa is required.
7. Business interests are given a dominant role in the skilled migration program (see pages 63 & 64 of the report)
The handover of important aspects of the immigration program to business interests is evidenced by the composition of the committee charged with reviewing the integrity of the 457 visa program in 2014, and by the composition of the Ministerial Advisory Council on Skilled Migration (MACSM) which was operating until mid-2017. The 457 visa review committee and the MACSM were comprised overwhelmingly of people representing business and migration interests. The MACSM had one union representative. Neither of the committees had anyone representing the 85% of the workforce that is non-unionised. No committee members represented the interests of the professional groups such as engineers which have been so badly impacted by the deliberate oversupply of the labour market.
Although the members of these committees conducted their work in a thorough and professional manner, in the opinion of the author immigration committees with such a narrow range of perspectives are not conducive to achieving a fair outcome that recognises the interests of Australian jobseekers.
The influence of business interests on the skilled migration program was again on display after the Government announced its changes to the subclass 457 and other visas on 19th April 2017. As a result of the changes in April, six of 21 engineering occupations were excluded from employer nominated visas (including the permanent subclass 186 visa and the temporary subclass 457 visa) because they were extremely oversupplied. On the 1st July 2017, following furious lobbying by business and other groups, changes were announced which wound back many of the reforms implemented in April.
In the engineering profession, the above six occupations once again became available for employer nominated visas, including the subclass 457 visa. However, unlike most engineering occupations, these six – plus one other – no longer required any market testing before a 457 visa could be granted. Following a complaint by the author of this website, market testing was reinstated for six of these seven engineering occupations in November 2017.
The handover of important aspects of the immigration program to business interests is evidenced by the composition of the committee charged with reviewing the integrity of the 457 visa program in 2014, and by the composition of the Ministerial Advisory Council on Skilled Migration (MACSM) which was operating until mid-2017. The 457 visa review committee and the MACSM were comprised overwhelmingly of people representing business and migration interests. The MACSM had one union representative. Neither of the committees had anyone representing the 85% of the workforce that is non-unionised. No committee members represented the interests of the professional groups such as engineers which have been so badly impacted by the deliberate oversupply of the labour market.
Although the members of these committees conducted their work in a thorough and professional manner, in the opinion of the author immigration committees with such a narrow range of perspectives are not conducive to achieving a fair outcome that recognises the interests of Australian jobseekers.
The influence of business interests on the skilled migration program was again on display after the Government announced its changes to the subclass 457 and other visas on 19th April 2017. As a result of the changes in April, six of 21 engineering occupations were excluded from employer nominated visas (including the permanent subclass 186 visa and the temporary subclass 457 visa) because they were extremely oversupplied. On the 1st July 2017, following furious lobbying by business and other groups, changes were announced which wound back many of the reforms implemented in April.
In the engineering profession, the above six occupations once again became available for employer nominated visas, including the subclass 457 visa. However, unlike most engineering occupations, these six – plus one other – no longer required any market testing before a 457 visa could be granted. Following a complaint by the author of this website, market testing was reinstated for six of these seven engineering occupations in November 2017.
8. Assessing authorities for migrant skills often have a major financial conflict of interest (see page 57 of the report)
Assessing authorities are those organisations appointed by the Federal Government to provide a formal assessment of the qualifications and experience of skilled migrants whose visas require a skills assessment. Many of these authorities are also the peak bodies for their profession. Engineers Australia is the peak body for the engineering profession, and is also the assessing authority.
Substantial fees are paid to the assessing authority by skilled migrants in return for the assessment of their qualifications and experience. For doing assessments for skilled migrants with occupations covered by the ANZSCO Minor Group ‘233 Engineering Professionals’, Engineers Australia earned about $5 million in the 2015-16 financial year. Membership fees are also collected from any migrants who subsequently become members of Engineers Australia.
These multi-million dollar revenue streams present organisations such as Engineers Australia with a significant conflict of interest when it comes to providing advice and submissions to the Government about levels of skilled migration. This is especially true when the labour market is already hugely oversupplied, as it is for engineering occupations. Engineers Australia’s two most recent submissions to the Federal Government’s annual review of the Skilled Occupation List (now MLTSSL) are critically reviewed in Section 13 of the report.
Assessing authorities are those organisations appointed by the Federal Government to provide a formal assessment of the qualifications and experience of skilled migrants whose visas require a skills assessment. Many of these authorities are also the peak bodies for their profession. Engineers Australia is the peak body for the engineering profession, and is also the assessing authority.
Substantial fees are paid to the assessing authority by skilled migrants in return for the assessment of their qualifications and experience. For doing assessments for skilled migrants with occupations covered by the ANZSCO Minor Group ‘233 Engineering Professionals’, Engineers Australia earned about $5 million in the 2015-16 financial year. Membership fees are also collected from any migrants who subsequently become members of Engineers Australia.
These multi-million dollar revenue streams present organisations such as Engineers Australia with a significant conflict of interest when it comes to providing advice and submissions to the Government about levels of skilled migration. This is especially true when the labour market is already hugely oversupplied, as it is for engineering occupations. Engineers Australia’s two most recent submissions to the Federal Government’s annual review of the Skilled Occupation List (now MLTSSL) are critically reviewed in Section 13 of the report.
9. The skilled migration program is not transparent (see pages 70 & 71 of the report)
Because so much data about the skilled migration program are not publicly available, the program cannot be scrutinised properly by members of the public or the media. Permanent residence visa data for occupations are made available only to a few select organisations. Detailed data (including ANZSCO classifications) about temporary visas such as the subclass 485 visa utilised by international graduates are not available. However, detailed data about the notorious subclass 457 visa program (now the subclass 482 TSS visa) – including the number of visas granted for individual occupations – are made publicly available by the Government.
The lack of transparency has carried over into the methodology used by DJSB for determining which occupations should be included on the SMOLs. The points-scoring system uses an ad-hoc grouping of labour-market parameters which do not provide a clear picture of demand and supply for occupations. In fact, for a number of the parameters it is unclear how they are even relevant to determining whether occupations should be included on the SMOLs.
In 2016, the annual Graduate Destinations Survey (GDS) conducted by Graduate Careers Australia (GCA) was abandoned and replaced by the Graduate Outcomes Survey (GOS) run by The Social Research Centre. Fewer details are now available: in engineering, for example, data are no longer available for individual engineering disciplines, but only for one broad ‘engineering’ group. And the response rate for the GOS is only two-thirds of that for the GDS.
Because so much data about the skilled migration program are not publicly available, the program cannot be scrutinised properly by members of the public or the media. Permanent residence visa data for occupations are made available only to a few select organisations. Detailed data (including ANZSCO classifications) about temporary visas such as the subclass 485 visa utilised by international graduates are not available. However, detailed data about the notorious subclass 457 visa program (now the subclass 482 TSS visa) – including the number of visas granted for individual occupations – are made publicly available by the Government.
The lack of transparency has carried over into the methodology used by DJSB for determining which occupations should be included on the SMOLs. The points-scoring system uses an ad-hoc grouping of labour-market parameters which do not provide a clear picture of demand and supply for occupations. In fact, for a number of the parameters it is unclear how they are even relevant to determining whether occupations should be included on the SMOLs.
In 2016, the annual Graduate Destinations Survey (GDS) conducted by Graduate Careers Australia (GCA) was abandoned and replaced by the Graduate Outcomes Survey (GOS) run by The Social Research Centre. Fewer details are now available: in engineering, for example, data are no longer available for individual engineering disciplines, but only for one broad ‘engineering’ group. And the response rate for the GOS is only two-thirds of that for the GDS.
10. Independent migrants are deceived (see pages 46 & 47 of the report)
Independent migrant engineers (and others) lodging offshore visa applications often do so because their occupation is listed on the MLTSSL. They believe that because the MLTSSL is a government document, it provides a true indication of the state of the engineering labour market. Upon arrival in Australia, many migrant engineers find that they have been deceived because they face a disastrously oversupplied jobs market where, in some occupations, there are 100‑200 applicants for every advertised vacancy.
Even if the migrant engineers understand that the MLTSSL is supposed to reflect the medium to long-term skills needs of the Australian economy, the listing of oversupplied engineering occupations on the MLTSSL by the Government each year is specifically intended to encourage migration during the subsequent year. Coming to Australia at a time when the job market is so poor means that for migrants who don’t secure engineering employment, their careers as engineers are likely to be irreparably damaged. They are treated like cannon fodder by the Government.
The unethical behavior by the Federal Government in continuing to list oversupplied engineering occupations on the MLTSSL has contributed to this outcome, and has been going on since 2012-13.
Independent migrant engineers (and others) lodging offshore visa applications often do so because their occupation is listed on the MLTSSL. They believe that because the MLTSSL is a government document, it provides a true indication of the state of the engineering labour market. Upon arrival in Australia, many migrant engineers find that they have been deceived because they face a disastrously oversupplied jobs market where, in some occupations, there are 100‑200 applicants for every advertised vacancy.
Even if the migrant engineers understand that the MLTSSL is supposed to reflect the medium to long-term skills needs of the Australian economy, the listing of oversupplied engineering occupations on the MLTSSL by the Government each year is specifically intended to encourage migration during the subsequent year. Coming to Australia at a time when the job market is so poor means that for migrants who don’t secure engineering employment, their careers as engineers are likely to be irreparably damaged. They are treated like cannon fodder by the Government.
The unethical behavior by the Federal Government in continuing to list oversupplied engineering occupations on the MLTSSL has contributed to this outcome, and has been going on since 2012-13.
11. Annual net overseas migration does not change to reflect changes in the skilled migration program (see page 70 of the report)
When occupations are removed from the MLTSSL or the STSOL, potential skilled migrants in these occupations and their families cannot obtain visas associated with the lists. Instead of reducing the annual net overseas migration (NOM) intake by a corresponding number of migrants, the Government always maintains a high level of NOM, which increases the likelihood that other occupations will become oversupplied.
When occupations are removed from the MLTSSL or the STSOL, potential skilled migrants in these occupations and their families cannot obtain visas associated with the lists. Instead of reducing the annual net overseas migration (NOM) intake by a corresponding number of migrants, the Government always maintains a high level of NOM, which increases the likelihood that other occupations will become oversupplied.